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In the United States, a non-citizen facing removal to his or her 
native country may seek a withdrawal or deferral of removal if the 
individual believes that he or she will be subjected to torture upon 
return.1 This legal right stems from the international obligations set 
forth in the United Nations Convention against Torture and Other 
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (the 
“Convention” or “CAT”), which obligates Member States to outlaw 
the use of torture both at home and abroad.2 As a signatory to the 
Convention, the United States agrees to, among other things, not 
“expel, return, or extradite” aliens to another country where they 
would be tortured.3 
CAT has been in effect in the United States since 1994 and, 
since that time, has been the subject of a litany of judicial decisions.4 
Only recently, however, have courts been forced to grapple with the 
concept of volition—i.e., free will (or lack thereof)—in determining 
whether to grant CAT relief to a particular applicant. By and large, 
                                                 
 1 See discussion infra Part II.C. 
 2 MICHAEL J. GARCIA, CONG. RESEARCH. SERV., RL 32276, THE U.N. 
CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE: OVERVIEW OF U.S. IMPLEMENTATION POLICY 
CONCERNING THE REMOVAL OF ALIENS 1 (2009). 
 3 Id. 
 4 Comm. Against Torture, Considerations of Reports Submitted by States Parties 
Under Article 19 of the Convention: United States of America, ¶3 U.N. Doc. 
CAT/C/28/Add.5 (Feb. 9, 2000). 
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these cases revolve around applicants who allege that they will be 
tortured for (1) exercising their political rights; (2) openly identifying 
as LGBTQ; or (3) exhibiting drug-addictive behavior.5 In each 
scenario, courts must grapple with the elusive question of free will, and 
specifically whether a person should be denied CAT relief on the 
ground that he or she could simply refrain from conduct that will likely 
elicit a torturous response. 
Broadly speaking, courts in the United States have granted 
CAT relief to petitioners who fall within either of the first two 
categories. It remains to be seen, however, whether courts will be as 
willing to grant CAT relief to individuals who submit credible evidence 
that they will be tortured upon removal to a foreign territory due to a 
drug addiction. To date, the only federal court to have been presented 
with the latter question is the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third 
Circuit. Although the court never reached the merits of the case at 
issue, it signaled a willingness to grant CAT relief to an application 
afflicted by drug addiction.6 
In this Article, I explore the ramifications of the Third Circuit’s 
decision, and offer an analysis as to why federal courts should not 
hesitate to grant CAT relief to those who suffer from drug addiction 
so long as the requisite legal standards are satisfied. I begin first with 
an overview of the events that led to the United Nations’ promulgation 
of CAT in 1984. I then turn to the manner in which CAT is applied in 
the United States, focusing specifically on how appellate courts have 
interpreted its various prescriptions in cases concerning political 
speech, sexual orientation, and drug addiction. Finally, I use the Third 
Circuit’s decision as a starting point for a broader discussion of free 
will and freedom of choice. 
                                                 
 5 See discussion infra Part III.A. 
 6 See discussion infra Part III.B. 
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II. BACKGROUND 
A. Predating the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhuman, or Degrading Punishment 
i. Post-World War II Developments 
On September 2, 1945, Japanese representatives signed the 
official Instrument of Surrender, marking the formal capitulation of 
Japan to the Allied Powers and, consequently, the end of World War 
II.7 Weeks later, on October 24, 1945, the Charter of the United 
Nations (“Charter”) was ceremoniously enacted, and, along with it, the 
inauguration of the world’s largest intergovernmental alliance.8 The 
United Nations (“UN”)—avowing to “save succeeding generations 
from the scourge of war”9—dedicated itself to the goal of achieving 
“international co-operation in solving international problems of an 
economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character.”10 
In the immediate wake of the deadliest conflict in human 
history,11 the UN proceeded expeditiously, and, within two months of 
its inception, promulgated the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (the “Genocide 
                                                 
 
 7 Instrument of Surrender, Sept. 2, 1945, 3 U.S.T. 1251, 139 U.N.T.S. 387, 
-surrender-documents/japanese-https://www.archives.gov/exhibits/featured
document (last visited Feb. 23, 2019). 
 8 International Organizations on the Web, THE WASHINGTON POST, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/inatl/longterm/intorgs.htm (last visited 
Oct. 4, 2015). 
 9 U.N. Charter pmbl., http://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/un-
charter-full-text/ (last visited Feb. 21, 2019). 
 10 Id. at art. 1, para. 3. 
 11 World War II History, THE NATIONAL WORLD WAR II MUSEUM, 
http://www.nationalww2museum.org/learn/education/for-students/ww2-history/ 
(last visited October 15, 2015). 
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Convention”).12 As the first human rights treaty adopted by the UN,13 
the legally-binding Genocide Convention focused on the universal 
protection of “national, ethnical, racial [and] religious” groups,14 and 
further underscored the importance of international cooperation in 
order to “liberate mankind from [the] odious scourge” of genocide.15 
As the first treaty to explicitly define genocide as an 
“international crime,”16 the Genocide Convention was a monumental 
achievement. Yet for many scholars, the Genocide Convention is not 
the UN’s most significant enactment; instead, scholars bestow that 
honor upon the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (“UDHR”) 
of 1948. Famously characterized by Eleanor Roosevelt as the 
“international Magna Carta for all mankind,”17 the UDHR represents 
the first “occasion on which the organized community of nations had 
made a declaration of human rights and fundamental freedoms.”18 
Perhaps most significantly, the UDHR was the first international edict 
to specifically outlaw the use of torture: “No one shall be subjected to 
torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”19 
                                                 
 12 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, S. Exec. Doc. O, 81-1 (1949), 78 U.N.T.S. 277 [hereinafter 
Genocide Convention]. 
 13 William Schabas, Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide, AUDIOVISUAL LIBRARY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2008), 
http://legal.un.org/avl/ha/cppcg/cppcg.html. 
 14 Genocide Convention, supra note 12, art. 2. 
 15 Id. pmbl. 
 16 RALPH A. WEISHEIT & FRANK MORN, PURSUING JUSTICE: TRADITIONAL 
AND CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN OUR COMMUNITIES AND THE WORLD 148 (2014). 
 17 Press Release, Amnesty International UK, Hampton Court Garden 
Celebrates Magna Carta as Human Rights Act Under Threat (June 8, 2015) (on file 
with author). 
 18 JOHANNES MORSINK, THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN 
RIGHTS: ORIGINS, DRAFTING AND INTENT 12 (1999) (quoting H.V. Evatt in the 
United Nations General Assembly Record, December 10, 1948, 934). 
 19 G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10, 
1948). 
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A groundbreaking enactment, the UDHR has paved the way for the 
adoption of more than seventy human rights treaties worldwide.20 
ii. Use of Torture During the Cold War Era 
Unfortunately, however, the germinal phase of the UN’s 
human rights movement did little to combat the practice of 
governmentally-authorized torture; indeed, nations around the world, 
from the authoritarian to the democratic, continued to “view torture 
as a mechanism for maintaining political control.”21 
One such country was the United States. Fueled by the hyper-
competitive atmosphere of the Cold War era, the Central Intelligence 
Agency (“CIA”), in 1963, went so far as to adopt the practice of torture 
as an official intelligence-gathering tool—a decision that stemmed 
from the government’s belief that “Russian and Chinese intelligence 
services had developed sophisticated tactics that could undermine U.S. 
intelligence-gathering efforts.”22 As set forth in the KUBARK 
Counterintelligence Interrogation Manual (the “KUBARK Manual”), 
the CIA took the position that the goal of coercion was not to inflict 
pain, but instead “to induce regression” and break down prisoners’ 
defenses.23 To that end, interrogators were taught to employ “coercive 
techniques of interrogation,” including: “arrest, detention, deprivation 
of sensory stimuli through solitary confinement or similar methods, 
threats and fear, debility, pain, heightened suggestibility and hypnosis, 
                                                 
 20 Antônio Augusto Cançado Trindade, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
AUDIOVISUAL LIBRARY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2008), 
http://legal.un.org/avl/ha/udhr/udhr.html 
 21 Matthew Lipman, The Development and Drafting of the United Nations 
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 
17 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 275, 290 (1994). 
 22 JOAN HOFF, A FAUSTIAN FOREIGN POLICY FROM WOODROW WILSON 
TO GEORGE W. BUSH: DREAMS OF PERFECTIBILITY 116 (2007); Jamie Mayerfield, 
Playing by Our Own Rules: How U.S. Marginalization of International Human Rights Law Led 
to Torture, 20 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 89, 98 (2007). 
 23 CIA, KUBARK COUNTERINTELLIGENCE INTERROGATION 1-
2 (1963), http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB122/#kubark 
nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB122/index.htm#kubark [hereinafter KUBARK 
Manual] 
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narcosis and induced regression.”24 According to the KUBARK 
Manual, these methods would generate “feelings of guilt and 
dependence in the prisoner as part of a relationship with the 
interrogator.”25 Once this relationship was established, the Manual 
instructed, the vulnerable prisoner would reveal valuable 
information.26 
iii. The United Nations Declaration on Torture 
On December 9, 1975, the UN General Assembly took a 
historic step toward the eradication of torture when it adopted the first 
international condemnation of torture:27 The Declaration on the 
Protection of All Persons from Being Subjected to Torture and Other 
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (“Declaration 
on Torture”).28 Although the Declaration on Torture is non-binding, 
the UN called upon Member States to make “unilateral declarations 
expressing their intent to comply with the United Nations Declaration 
on Torture.”29 
Despite the UN’s efforts, however, the non-binding 
Declaration on Torture was largely ineffective. While it is true that it 
led to a few notable achievements—e.g., the establishment of the 
United Nations Voluntary Fund for Victims of Torture, which assisted 
                                                 
 24 Linda Qiu, Haspel Says C.I.A. ‘Historically’ Has Not Interrogated Subjects. 
History Shows Otherwise, N.Y. TIMES (May 9, 2018). 
 25 Id. KUBARK Manual, supra note 23, at 85. 
 26 John Parry, Torture Nation, Torture Law, 97 GEO. L.J. 1001, 1010 (2009) 
(citing KUBARK Manual, supra note 23, at 83). The practice of torture was certainly 
not limited to the United States. In 1954, for example, French forces tortured 
Algerian detainees to gather information about the Algerian National Liberation 
Front’s organization, membership, and use of the guerilla forces. See PIERRE VIDAL-
NAQUET, TORTURE: CANCER OF DEMOCRACY–FRANCE AND ALGERIA 
1954-1962 80-82 (1963). 
 27 Lipman, supra note 21, at 303. 
 28 G.A. Res. 3452 (XXX), The Declaration on the Protection of all Persons 
from Being Subjected to Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment 
or Punishment, at 91 (Dec. 9, 1975) [hereinafter Declaration Against Torture] 
 29 See G.A. Res. 32/64, at 137 (Dec. 8, 1977). 
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the victims of governmental abuse30—the fact remained that, as of 
1980, “more than a third of the world’s governments . . . used or 
tolerated torture or ill-treatment of prisoners.”31 
In 1984, the UN’s axiomatic failure in this regard was revealed 
when Amnesty International released a report (the “Amnesty Report”) 
detailing more than 3,500 individual allegations of torture across 
ninety-eight countries between 1974 and 1983.32 Damningly, the 
Amnesty Report categorized torture as being “part of the state-
controlled machinery to suppress dissent,”33 a practice that affected 
“all social classes, age groups, trades and professions.”34 Citing the 
Genocide Convention’s success in “outlawing genocide for all time,” 
Amnesty International strongly urged the UN to adopt the then-draft 
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment, which Amnesty believed would be “a truly 
effective weapon against torture.”35 
B. Critical Provisions of the UN’s Convention Against Torture and 
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. 
The UN General Assembly formally adopted the Convention 
Against Torture on December 10, 1984—just a few months after the 
publication of the Amnesty Report.36 After ratification by the requisite 
twenty States, the Convention entered into force on June 26, 1987.37 
                                                 
 30 By February 1990, the Fund had accumulated contributions and pledges 
of roughly $350,000. See United Nations Voluntary Fund for Victims of Torture, 
Note by the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1990/16 (Feb. 26, 1990). 
 31 AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, TORTURE IN THE EIGHTIES 2-3 
(1984) [hereinafter Amnesty Report]. 
 32 Id. 
 33 Lipman, supra note 21, at 309. 
 34 Amnesty Report, supra note 31, at 9. 
 35 Id. at 3. 
 36 Hans Danelius, Convention against Torture 
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, AUDIOVISUAL 
LIBRARY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2008), 
http://legal.un.org/avl/ha/catcidtp/catcidtp.html 
 37 Id. 
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The following sections provide an overview of the Convention’s 
principal provisions. 
i. Definition of Torture 
Article 1 of CAT defines torture as “any act by which severe 
pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted 
on a person . . . by or at the instigation of or with the consent or 
acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official 
capacity.”38 This definition does not include “pain or suffering arising 
only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions.”39 CAT Article 
2 further makes clear that “no exceptional circumstances whatsoever,” 
including a state of war or any other public emergency, may be invoked 
to justify torture.40 
ii. Jurisdiction 
With regard to jurisdiction, the issue prior to CAT’s official 
adoption was whether “each State should undertake, in respect of 
torture, to assume jurisdiction not only based on territory or the 
offender’s nationality but also over acts of torture committed outside 
its territory by persons not being its nationals.”41 Ultimately, the UN 
General Assembly embraced the principle of universal jurisdiction,42 
pursuant to which each State is obligated to retain jurisdiction over 
                                                 
 38 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 100-20, 1465 
U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter CAT]. 
 39 Id. art. 1. 
 40 Id. art. 2. Article 2 states, in full: 
(1) Each State Party shall take effective legislative, administrative, judicial or other 
measures to prevent acts of torture in any territory under its jurisdiction; 
(2) No exceptional circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of war or a threat of 
war, internal political instability or any other public emergency, may be invoked as a 
justification of torture. 
(3) An order from a superior officer or a public authority may not be invoked as a 
justification of torture. 
 41 Danelius, supra note 36. 
 42 Id. 
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cases in which the “alleged offender is present in [its] territory[,]” lest 
there be cause for extradition under Article 8.43 
iii. International Implementation 
Because the effectiveness of CAT was largely dependent upon 
its implementation at the international level, the General Assembly 
decided to implement, through Article 17, a Committee Against 
Torture to be responsible for performing a number of essential 
duties.44 Among other things, these duties included: commenting on 
states parties’ periodic reports on the measures taken to ensure 
compliance with the Convention;45 initiating an investigation when 
reliable information indicates that torture is being “systematically 
practi[c]ed in the territory of a [s]tate [p]arty[;]”46 examining complaints 
by one state party alleging violations of the Convention by another 
state party;47 and examining applications by individuals claiming to be 
victims of a violation of the Convention by a state party.48 
iv. State Party Responsibilities 
While several provisions delineate State Party responsibilities 
under CAT,49 two Articles are particularly salient for purposes of this 
discussion. First, Article 14 unequivocally and unambiguously requires 
each State Party to ensure that any victim of an act of torture is 
provided with a legal right to obtain redress as well as fair and adequate 
compensation.50 In contrast to other CAT provisions, Article 14 
applies extraterritorially, meaning that all victims—regardless of their 
nationality—must be afforded legal protection from torture.51 
                                                 
 43 CAT art. 5, para. 2. 
 44 Danelius, supra note 36. 
 45 CAT art. 19. 
 46 Id. art. 20. 
 47 Id. art. 21. 
 48 Id. art. 22. 
 49 See generally id. arts. 2, 5, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, 16, 20, 21, 22. 
 50 Id. art. 14. 
 51 Christopher K. Hall, The Duty of States Parties to the Convention against Torture 
to Provide Procedures Permitting Victims to Recover Reparations for Torture Committed Abroad, 
18 EUROPEAN J. INT’L L. 921, 923 (2007). 
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Second, Article 3, which operates via the domestic procedural 
obligations imposed under Article 14, is especially relevant because it 
prohibits the expulsion, return, or extradition of “a person to another 
State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he [or she] 
would be in danger of being subjected to torture.”52 Article 3(1) is of 
paramount importance because it is the only CAT provision that 
expressly obliges a state party to address torture committed abroad.53 
Additionally, in determining whether there is sufficient evidence to 
conclude that an individual would be in danger of being subjected to 
torture in a foreign country, Article 3(2) requires state parties to 
examine “all relevant considerations including, where applicable, the 
existence in the state concerned of a consistent pattern of gross, 
flagrant or mass violations of human rights.”54 
As will be explored in detail below, courts in the United States 
most often apply Article 3’s provisions in situations where an alien or 
temporary permanent resident has committed certain crimes that 
subject the individual to removal to his or her native country. 
C. The Convention Against Torture as applied in the United States 
i. The United States’ Implementation of CAT 
The United States, under the authority of President Ronald 
Reagan, signed CAT on April 18, 1988; however, it did not become 
legally binding until the Senate ratified the Treaty six years later, on 
October 21, 1994.55 Notably, the ratified version contained certain 
provisions that differed from language contained in the original UN 
Convention, “including a declaration that CAT Articles 1 through 16 
were not self-executing, and therefore required domestic 
                                                 
 52 CAT art. 3, para. 1 (emphasis added). 
 53 Hall, supra note 51, at 925. 
 54 CAT art. 3, para. 2. 
 55 Office of the Press Secretary, Message to the Senate Transmitting the 
Convention Against Torture and Inhuman Treatment or Punishment, May 20, 1988, 
RONALD REAGAN PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENT: 
RONALD REAGAN (1981–1989) 
https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/research/speeches/052088f(last visited February 23, 2019); 
Garcia, supra note 2, at 3. 
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implementing legislation.”56 As such, the United States’ 
implementation of CAT differs in several important respects from the 
criterions initially set forth by the UN. 
ii. CAT Principles as Set Forth Under U.S. Law 
Under U.S. law, “torture” is defined, in part, as “severe pain or 
suffering (physical or mental) that is intentionally inflicted by or at the 
instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official, 
or other person acting in an official capacity.”57 This articulation is 
essentially the same as that prescribed in CAT Article 1, although, in 
practice, the definition has come to connote an “extreme” form of 
cruel and inhumane punishment that “does not include lesser forms of 
cruel, inhumane, or degrading treatment . . . .”58 Under this 
interpretation, “police brutality,” for example, does not amount to 
torture for purposes of the Convention.59 
Generally speaking, CAT-based regulations concerning the 
removal of aliens from the United States are covered under §§ 208.16-
208.18 and 1208.16-1208.18 of title 8 of the Code of Federal 
Regulations (“C.F.R.”). Notably, CAT Article 3 is codified in 8 C.F.R. 
§ 208.18(a)(1), which states that torture includes, inter alia, acts 
committed by or at the acquiescence of a public official or other person 
acting in an official capacity.60 This section is vital because, in order to 
obtain CAT relief in the United States, individuals subject to removal 
need not show that foreign persons operating under the color of 
                                                 
 56 A “non-self-executing agreement will not be given effect as law in the 
absence of necessary implementation”). See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 111 (1987). 
 57 OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE 
EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, FACT SHEET: ASYLUM AND 
WITHHOLDING OF REMOVAL RELIEF CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE 
PROTECTIONS, (2009), 
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/eoir/legacy/2009/01/23/AsylumWith
holdingCATProtections.pdf [hereinafter “DOJ Fact Sheet”]. 
 58 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(a). See also Garcia, supra note 2, at 2. 
 59 Garcia, supra note 2, at 2. 
 60 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(a)(1). See also SEN. EXEC. RPT. 101-30, Resolution of 
Advice and Consent to Ratification, Art. II(1)(b) (1990) [hereinafter “Sen. 
Resolution”]. 
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extraterritorial law directly engaged in tortuous conduct; rather, it is 
sufficient for CAT purposes to proffer evidence that a public official 
had “awareness of such activity and thereafter breached his or her legal 
responsibility to intervene [and] prevent” it from occurring.61 This 
understanding is echoed in an array of federal and administrative 
decisions, which state that, in order to demonstrate “acquiescence” on 
the part of state officials, an individual seeking CAT relief must 
demonstrate “willful blindness” by foreign officials with regard to 
tortuous conduct.62 
In terms of applying CAT Article 3 to petitions for relief, the 
Senate decided that reprieve is justified under circumstances in which 
it would be “more likely than not” that an alien would be tortured upon 
removal to a foreign country.63 To obtain CAT relief, an applicant 
bears the burden of proffering sufficient evidence to allow an 
immigration judge (“IJ”) to find that “a greater than fifty percent 
chance of torture” will occur upon removal.64 This undertaking often 
requires the claimant to not only tender testimony on his or her own 
behalf, but to further proffer supplementary evidence—generally in 
the form of expert testimony—regarding the use of torture in his or 
her native country. 
In assessing whether it is “more likely than not” that an 
applicant would be tortured upon removal to the proposed country, 
courts are required to consider all evidence relevant to the possibility 
of future torture, including: (1) evidence of past torture inflicted upon 
the applicant; (2) a pattern or practice of gross human rights violations 
                                                 
 61 Id. 
 62 See, e.g., Silva-Rengifo v. Atty. Gen. of United States, 473 F.3d 58, 70 (3d 
Cir. 2007) (“[A]cquisence to torture requires only that the government remain 
willfully blind to tortuous conduct and breach their legal responsibility to prevent 
it.”); Rodriguez Morales v. United States Atty. Gen., 488 F.3d 884 (11th Cir. 
2007)(explaining that “acquiescence” to torture means that the government was 
aware of the torture, yet breached its responsibility to intervene). 
 63 Sen. Resolution, supra note 60 at Art. II(2). 
 64 Edu v. Holder, 624 F.3d 1137, 1145 n. 16 (9th Cir. 2010)(citing Wakkary 
v. Holder, 558 F.3d 1049, 1067–68 (9th Cir.2009); Khup v. Ashcroft, 376 F.3d 898, 907 
(9th Cir.2004)). 
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within the proposed country of removal; and (3) other relevant 
information regarding conditions in the country of removal.65 
iii. Grounds for Removal 
Broadly speaking, aliens may be subject to removal from the 
United States in two primary scenarios, namely where the applicant: 
(1) is deemed in admissible at the time of entry to the United States or 
(2) has committed certain criminal offenses, i.e., crimes involving moral 
turpitude, controlled substance violations, firearm offenses, aggravated 
felonies, or crimes of domestic violence.66 
iv. CAT Protections 
CAT provides two types of protections—(i) withholding of 
removal and (ii) deferral of removal—both of which ensure that aliens 
                                                 
 65 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(3). “In assessing whether it is more likely than not 
that an applicant would be tortured in the proposed country of removal, all evidence 
relevant to the possibility of future torture shall be considered, including, but not 
limited to: 
(i)§ 1208.16(c)(3)(i) Evidence of past torture inflicted upon the applicant; 
(ii)§ 1208.16(c)(3)(ii) Evidence that the applicant could relocate to a part of the 
country of removal where he or she is not likely to be tortured; 
(iii)§ 1208.16(c)(3)(iii) Evidence of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights 
within the country of removal, where applicable; and 
(iv)§ 1208.16(c)(3)(iv) Other relevant information regarding conditions in the 
country of removal.” 
 66 See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1227(a), which states, in full: Any alien (including an alien 
crewman) in and admitted to the United States shall, upon the order of the Attorney 
General, be removed if the alien is within one or more of the following classes of 
deportable aliens: 
1)Is deemed inadmissible at time of entry or is found to have violated adjustment of 
status conditions; 
(2)Committed certain criminal offenses, i.e., crimes involving moral turpitude, 
controlled substance violations, firearm offenses, aggravated felonies, or crimes of 
domestic violence; 
(3)Failed to register a change in address or criminal conviction or falsified 
documents; 
(4)Is found to be a national security threat; 
(5)Has become a public charge subsequent to entry; and 
   (6)Violated voting laws 
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are not to be returned to a country where they would face torture.67 
The former represents a more secure form of CAT protection 
compared to the second because the IJ’s decision to withhold (as 
opposed to merely defer) removal signifies that the petitioner will not, 
at any time, be returned to his or her native country.68 
Deferral of removal also prohibits the removal of aliens to a 
specific country where they would face torture, but, as the name 
suggests, constitutes a temporary form of protection in that relief can 
be terminated if it is later determined that an alien is no longer likely 
to be tortured in the country of removal.69 In a similar vein, relief may 
be withdrawn if the U.S. government receives diplomatic assurances 
that the alien will not be tortured upon removal.70 Oftentimes, deferral 
of removal is granted to aliens whose crimes fall under the provisions 
requiring mandatory denial of withholding of removal, e.g., certain 
criminals and persecutors.71 
v. Immigration Judge Standard of Review 
Because the very nature of CAT relief is prognostic, claimants 
petitioning for relief must submit a presumptive chain of events that 
carry a high likelihood of occurring upon removal. Under the standard 
set forth in In Re J.F.F., 23 I. & N. Dec. 912 (A.G. 2006), an 
immigration judge must assess the probability that the proffered chain 
of events—taken together—will more likely than not result in torture. 
As set out below, such an undertaking is, by its very nature, speculative, 
as it calls for a prediction as to what is likely to happen if a petitioner 
is removed. 
First, the IJ must conduct an inquiry into whether the evidence 
supports a finding that “each step in [the [proposed] hypothetical chain 
of events is more likely than not to happen.”72 If the IJ determines that 
the totality of evidence supports such a finding, then the IJ proceeds 
                                                 
 67 See DOJ Fact Sheet, supra note 57. 
 68 See id.  
 69 See 8 C.F.R. § 208.17(d)(3). 
 70 See 8 C.F.R. § 208.17(f). 
 71 DOJ Fact Sheet, supra note 57; 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(d)(2)–(3). 
 72 In Re J.F.F., 23 I. & N. Dec. 912, 912 (A.G. 2006). 
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to the second prong of the analysis. It is essential to recognize, 
however, that while this first step connotes a necessary condition for 
granting CAT relief, it is not, in and of itself, sufficient for doing so.73 
The IJ’s calculation under the second prong of the JFF 
standard essentially effectuates the IJ’s ultimate conclusion to either 
grant or deny CAT relief, as this analysis requires the IJ to determine 
whether the “likelihood of all necessary events coming together” is “more 
likely than not [to] lead to torture. . . .”74 In this regard, the IJ must 
view the entire causal chain in the aggregate and determine whether 
the likelihood of an alien being subjected to torture is greater than fifty 
percent.75 Thus, if the IJ concludes that each individual link is more 
likely than not to occur, and the likelihood of these links coming 
together and leading to torture is greater than fifty percent, then CAT 
relief may be granted.76 
vi. Appellate Standard of Review 
In essence, an IJ’s inquiry regarding the likelihood of torture is 
a mixed inquiry of fact and law.77 When the IJ makes a determination 
as to what is likely to happen if a petitioner is removed, the court is 
resolving a factual question.78 On the other hand, if the IJ concludes 
that, based upon the evidence presented, what is likely to happen if 
removal occurs amounts to a form of torture, then the IJ is resolving a legal 
question.79 
Upon review, the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) must 
evaluate the IJ’s factual determination for clear error, but may review 
                                                 
 73 See id. at 918 n. 4 (“An alien will never be able to show that he faces a 
more likely than not chance of torture if one link in the chain cannot be shown to be 
more likely than not to occur. It is the likelihood of all necessary events coming 
together that must more likely than not lead to torture, and a chain of events cannot 
be more likely than its least likely link.”). 
 74 Id. (emphasis added). 
 75 See id. 
 76 See id. 
 77 See, e.g., Kaplun v. Att’y Gen. of the U.S., 602 F.3d 260, 271 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 78 See id. 
 79 See id. 
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the IJ’s legal conclusion de novo.80 A Court of Appeals, meanwhile, 
retains jurisdiction over constitutional claims and questions of law 
only.81 
III. ANALYSIS 
A. Case Law Discussion: Torture on the Basis of Exercising 
Individual Rights 
As a general rule, courts tend to grant CAT relief to aliens who 
present sufficient evidence that, upon removal, they will be unable to 
refrain from certain conduct and thereby be subjected to torture. Cases 
in this category center on instances in which an individual claims (1) 
that he or she will be tortured for exercising a certain fundamental 
right—e.g., freedom of speech—or (2) will be subjected to torture due 
to his or her sexual predisposition. 
In Edu v. Holder, for example, a woman named Edu faced 
removal to her native country of Nigeria after being convicted of 
assault with a deadly weapon in California.82 During her hearing before 
the IJ, Edu stated that, prior to coming to the United States, she had 
been “detained, raped and beaten by [Nigerian] police or military in 
response” to protesting the Nigerian government’s failure to, among 
other things, provide roads and drinking water, as well as schooling 
and jobs to minority graduates.83 In seeking CAT relief, Edu 
maintained that she would continue to engage in similar political 
protests if removed to Nigeria, and, as a result, would be subjected to 
further torture because “anybody who is associated with 
demonstrating, regardless of location, will be tortured or killed.”84 
The IJ granted Edu’s request for CAT protection, but the 
Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) reversed that decision and 
ordered her removed to Nigeria. According to the BIA, Edu could 
                                                 
 
 80 See id. 
 81 See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C)-(D). 
 82 See Edu v. Holder, supra note 64, at 1139 n. 2. 
 83 Id. at 1139. 
 84 Id. at 1140-41. 
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avoid subjecting herself to torture by simply refraining from engaging 
in government protests.85 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit, however, found such logic to be “an aberration . . . so 
antithetical to the intent of [CAT] law that it [could not] stand,” and 
accordingly reversed the BIA’s ruling.86 In so doing, the court held that 
“CAT’s precepts” afforded protection to “individuals like Edu who are 
unwilling, as a matter of conscience, to give up acting on their political 
beliefs.”87 
In a similar vein, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit held in Ali v. Mukasey that Ali, a forty-two year old Guyanese 
native and citizen, was entitled to CAT relief on the ground that it was 
more likely than not that he would be tortured in his native country 
due to his homosexuality.88 At his trial before the IJ, Ali testified that 
the punishment in Guyana for sodomy is life in prison, and that he 
would be tortured if imprisoned for that crime.89 The IJ, however, 
denied Ali’s request for CAT relief, reasoning that no one “in Guyana 
would even know that Ali was a homosexual” unless Ali did something 
“explicitly homosexual,” such as find a “partner or cooperating person 
. . . .”90 Resolving that Ali failed to present evidence that he was “likely 
to form such a close relationship within a foreseeable period of time,” 
the IJ accordingly denied his petition for CAT relief.91 
On appeal before the Second Circuit, Ali argued that the IJ 
violated his due process rights “by failing to consider all the evidence 
in support of his sexual orientation-based claim.”92 The court agreed 
with Ali’s contention, opining that the IJ’s “comments reflect[ed] an 
impermissible reliance on preconceived assumptions about 
homosexuality and homosexuals” that intolerably amounted to “the 
appearance of bias or hostility.”93 In fact, the Second Circuit took the 
                                                 
 85 See id. at 1141. 
 86 Id. 
 87 See Edu v. Holder, supra note 64, at 1146. 
 88 See Ali v. Mukasey, 529 F.3d 478, 482 (2nd Cir. 2008). 
 89 See id. at 486. 
 90 Id. at 487 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 91 Id. 
 92 Id. at 488. 
 93 Ali v. Mukasey, supra note 88, at 492. 
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remarkable step of ordering that Immigration Judge Alan Vomacka be 
removed from the case altogether —as the court explained, Judge 
Vomacka “clearly abrogated his responsibility to function as a neutral, 
impartial arbiter” by voicing “stereotypes about homosexual 
orientation and the way in which homosexuals are perceived, both in 
the United States and Guyana,” without “reference to any support in 
the record.”94 
As these cases and others make clear,95 courts are progressively 
apprehending the importance of safeguarding aliens from the 
possibility of being tortured in foreign countries for exercising of 
certain rights. Underlying this trend is the notion that free will, or, at 
the very least, freedom of choice, embodies a virtue so sacrosanct that 
courts must take it upon themselves to ensure its protection. 
B. A Look to the Future: CAT Relief and Autonomy 
That said, it remains to be seen whether courts will be willing 
to uphold the principle of volitional independence in the context of 
drug addiction. To date, only one federal court has encountered the 
question of whether a drug addiction may serve as a basis for CAT 
relief—i.e., that the inability to combat addictive impulses will lead to 
torture upon removal. In my view, addiction should be afforded the 
same protection as the exercise of political rights or adherence to an 
innate sexual predisposition; as a matter of principle, it falls within the 
realm of cognitive volition, which, per recent judicial opinions, merits 
protection. 
                                                 
 94 Id. at 491. 
 95 See, e.g., Jean-Pierre v. AG of the United States, 500 F.3d 1315 (11th Cir. 
2007) (remanding to the BIA on the grounds that “the undisputed evidence seemed 
to show that [the appellant] likely would be singled out for crawl-space confinement 
. . . and beatings with metal rods due to his AIDS-related mental illness and prior 
felony convictions”); Avendano-Hernandez v. Lynch, 800 F.3d 1072, 1081 (9th Cir. 
2015) (holding that, because violence “continues to plague transgender women in 
Mexico,” Avendano-Hernandez, a self-identified transgender woman, was entitled to 
CAT protection); Doe v. Holder, 736 F.3d 871 (9th Cir. 2013) (holding that the 
claimant seeking CAT relief “met his burden of presenting evidence that the Russian 
government was unable or unwilling to control the nongovernmental actors who 
persecuted him because he was a homosexual.”). 
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Thus far, the only case addressing CAT relief within the 
context of drug addiction that has made its way to the federal circuit is 
Kamal Jamai v. Atty. Gen. This case has its genesis in October 2013, 
when the government served Kamal Jamai (“Jamai”), a 32-year-old 
native and citizen of Morocco, with a notice to appear, charging him, 
inter alia, as removable in light of his multiple criminal convictions.96 
Jamai conceded the charges and sought deferral of removal under 
CAT.97 
Jamai has been a heroin addict since 2004.98 At his hearing 
before the IJ, Jamai argued that, because of his addiction, he would 
almost certainly relapse into using heroin upon removal, which would 
lead to his arrest and torture by law enforcement in Morocco.99 
To support his claim, Jamai proffered testimony summarizing 
his decade-long battle with a heroin addiction, which originated out of 
an opiate dependence that he developed following a dental procedure 
                                                 
 
 96 See generally Jamai v. AG of the United States, No. 15-1116, 2015 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 22933 (3d Cir. 2015) [herein after “Jamai”]. See also U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i)-
(iii) dealing with “Classes of Deportable Aliens: “Any alien (including an alien 
crewman) in and admitted to the United States shall, upon the order of the Attorney 
General, be removed if the alien is within one or more of the following classes of 
deportable aliens: 
(2) Criminal offenses: 
(i) Crimes of moral turpitude. Any alien who-- 
    (I) is convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude 
committed within five years (or 10 years in the case of an alien provided lawful 
permanent resident status under section 245(j) [8 USCS § 1255(j)]) after the date of 
admission, and 
  (II) is convicted of a crime for which a sentence of one year or longer may 
be imposed, is deportable. 
 (ii) Multiple criminal convictions. Any alien who at any time after admission 
is convicted of two or more crimes involving moral turpitude, not arising out of a 
single scheme of criminal misconduct, regardless of whether confined therefor and 
regardless of whether the convictions were in a single trial, is deportable. 
 (iii) Aggravated felony. Any alien who is convicted of an aggravated felony at 
any time after admission is deportable.” 
 97 See Jamai, supra note 96 at *3. 
 98 See id. 
 99 See id. 
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in 2004.100 Shortly after he began abusing opiates, Jamai graduated to 
using heroin and, since then, has engaged in a cyclical pattern of heroin 
use, theft, temporary sobriety, and eventual relapse.101 
According to Jamai, his relapses have been triggered mainly by 
stress, which he emphasized would be compounded if he were 
removed to Morocco.102 To further bolster this contention, Jamai 
submitted documentary evidence describing the manner in which 
heroin addiction chemically alters the brain, as well as evidence 
supporting his contention that relapse is often triggered by stress.103 
An expert on Moroccan political institutions from Duke 
University testified on Jamai’s behalf as well, explaining that drug 
treatment resources in Morocco are not only limited and deprioritized, 
but that Moroccan authorities “would more likely than not torture 
Jamai” if he were to relapse into heroin use, as “the use of torture to 
secure confessions for unsolved crimes . . . is prevalent in Morocco.”104 
At the conclusion of the hearing, the IJ granted Jamai’s petition 
for CAT relief, finding that Jamai had demonstrated by a 
preponderance of the evidence that he would be tortured if removed 
to Morocco.105 Specifically, the IJ concluded that Jamai is a heroin 
addict and that each link in Jamai’s proposed chain of events was more 
likely than not to occur, namely: 
                                                 
 100 Oral Argument at 4:00, Jamai v. Atty. Gen. (No. 15-1116). Moreover, for 
further reference, opioids are medications that relieve pain. Specifically, “[t]hey 
reduce the intensity of pain signals reaching the brain and affect those brain areas 
controlling emotion, which diminishes the effects of a painful stimulus. Medications 
that fall within this class include hydrocodone (e.g., Vicodin), oxycodone (e.g., 
OxyContin, Percocet), morphine (e.g., Kadian, Avinza), codeine, and related drugs.” 
See NATIONAL INSTITUTE ON DRUG ABUSE, available at 
http://www.drugabuse.gov/publications/research-reports/prescription-
drugs/opioids/what-are-opioids 
 101 See Jamai, supra note 96 at *7. 
 102 See Jamai, supra note 96 at *3. 
 103 See id. at *4. 
 104 Id. 
 105 Id. 
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(1) Jamai will relapse if removed to Morocco; 
(2) Jamai will not seek or receive adequate treatment for his 
addiction in Morocco; 
(3) as a result of his addiction and lack of adequate treatment, 
Jamai will be arrested by Moroccan authorities; and 
(4) Jamai will be subjected to torture by the police.106 
The BIA, however, reversed the IJ’s determination, finding 
Jamai’s chain of events to be “based on a string of suppositions which 
are unproven on [the] record.”107 In accordance with this conclusion, 
the BIA ruled that the IJ committed “clear error” in finding it to be 
“more likely than not that [Jamai] will be tortured if removed to 
Morocco.”108 
Jamai subsequently petitioned the Third Circuit for review of 
the BIA’s decision, arguing that the IJ’s decision to grant him CAT 
relief should be reinstated.109 On December 31, 2015, the Third Circuit 
vacated the BIA’s decision and remanded the case for further 
proceedings “[b]ecause the BIA did not adequately explain the 
                                                 
 106 Id. at *4-5. 
 107 Id. at *5. The BIA’s reasoning for its conclusion is explained in a single 
paragraph: 
[T]he [IJ] determined, without adequate documentary or qualified expert witness 
evidence on the issue, that it is more likely than not that [Jamai] will relapse and use 
heroin in Morocco. While there is some evidence in the record concerning the 
frequent relapse of heroin addicts, the record lacks testimony from a qualified expert 
or documentation assessing the likelihood that a person in [Jamai’s] specific 
circumstances is likely to relapse. [Jamai] has been able to refrain from using heroin 
for more than 2 years and claims to fear severe consequences should he resume its 
use in Morocco. Furthermore, the [IJ] assumed that [Jamai] would not seek out any 
treatment that may be available to prevent such a relapse. [Jamai’s] evidence also does 
not prove each step in the hypothetical chain concerning whether the authorities 
would become aware of any future heroin use and arrest him, that he would then 
refuse to confess his guilt, and that he thus would be tortured for the purpose of 
procuring his confession. 
 108 Jamai, supra note 96, at *5. 
 109 Id. at *1. 
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reasoning underlying its decision.”110 Specifically, the court found itself 
“unable to meaningfully review the BIA’s decision” because the BIA 
“effectively discredited” certain evidence “without explanation.”111 
Accordingly, the court remanded Jamai’s case with instructions to the 
BIA to more thoroughly explicate its analysis.112 
Unfortunately, however, the Third Circuit refrained from 
opining on the merits of Jamai’s claim. Nevertheless, the three-judge 
panel assigned to the case offered insight during oral argument on the 
question of whether Jamai’s addiction could serve as a basis for 
obtaining CAT relief.113 
In a spirited back-and-forth with counsel for the Department 
of Justice, Judge Dolores Sloviter took issue with the notion that 
Jamai’s drug addiction may entitle him to relief under CAT: 
What is the position of the Justice Department as to 
whether somebody can purposely, and of his or her own 
volition get into CAT? In other words, we’re not talking 
about . . . a medical condition. This is heroin, and 
[Jamai] steals. These are all voluntary actions by the 
                                                 
 110 Id. 
 111 Id. at *8. 
 112 See id. 
 113 For information about the assignment of judges and panels are the 
appellate level, see 28 U.S. Code § 46 (b), which states: 
(b) In each circuit the court may authorize the hearing and determination of cases 
and controversies by separate panels, each consisting of three judges, at least a 
majority of whom shall be judges of that court, unless such judges cannot sit because 
recused or disqualified, or unless the chief judge of that court certifies that there is 
an emergency including, but not limited to, the unavailability of a judge of the court 
because of illness. Such panels shall sit at the times and places and hear the cases and 
controversies assigned as the court directs. The United States Court of Appeals for 
the Federal Circuit shall determine by rule a procedure for the rotation of judges 
from panel to panel to ensure that all of the judges sit on a representative cross 
section of the cases heard and, notwithstanding the first sentence of this subsection, 
may determine by rule the number of judges, not less than three, who constitute a 
panel. 
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individual. So, is a person who voluntarily does these 
things entitled to CAT?114 
Shortly thereafter—after the government respectfully declined 
to speculate as to the Justice Department’s official position on the 
matter of volition and drug addiction—Judge Sloviter again posited 
whether drug addiction was indeed a medical issue or, contrarily, 
simply a matter of volition: “Enough about calling it a disease. I’m not 
sure that we can accept the fact that voluntary drug-taking is a disease 
. . . This is a voluntary addict.”115 
As her statements suggest, Judge Sloviter—at least for the sake 
of argument—pushed back against the notion that a criminal could 
obtain CAT relief on the basis that, by engaging in criminal behavior 
both willfully and voluntarily, he would consequently be tortured. 
Judge Marjorie Rendell, on other hand, seemed sympathetic to 
Jamai’s claim; responding to the government’s contention that “there’s 
something perverse . . . about an individual’s claim for CAT protection 
based on the fact that [he] is a heroin addict, steal[s], and refuses to get 
treatment,” Judge Rendell countered, “we have a policy that underlies 
CAT. You can be the worst criminal, and if it’s shown that you’re going 
to be tortured, we will not send you to a place where you’re going to 
be tortured.”116 
Here, Judge Rendell’s initial inclination seems to be that, if the 
IJ finds an alien’s testimony to be credible, then the court is not in the 
position to espouse its own moral judgment as to whether drug 
addiction should serve as a basis for relief. Put differently, Judge 
Rendell seems to be of the view that if the IJ makes a credible finding 
that an individual’s medical condition may lead to he or she being 
tortured upon removal, the protection afforded under CAT should not 
be curtailed. 
Even still, the most interesting comment made during oral 
argument was that made by Judge Thomas Vanaskie. Delving into the 
                                                 
 114 Oral Argument, supra note 100 at 33:14. 
 115 Id. at 38:19.Check. 
 116 Id. at 18:00. 
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logic and seemingly philosophical rationale underlying Jamai’s claim, 
Judge Vanaksie queried: “If [Jamai] were to say, ‘[when] I go back to 
Morocco, there’s this person that I’m under compulsion to kill, and, 
after I kill that person, I’m going to be tortured,’ would he be entitled 
to Convention Against Torture relief then?”117 Jamai’s counsel 
shrewdly dodged a direct answer to the question, but nevertheless 
acknowledged that “there is a volition[al]” element to Jamai’s case.118 
This statement scratches the surface of an interesting thought 
experiment: what are the potential consequences of allowing a criminal 
to rely upon neurological impulses and compulsions as a basis for 
arguing against removal? If the court were to grant Jamai CAT relief 
on the premise that, because of his prolonged heroin addiction, he will 
be unable to refrain from similar addictive behavior in Morocco, then 
to what extent will the court view addictions to other drugs—like 
prescription painkillers, cocaine, or methamphetamine—as similarly 
being an insurmountable curtailment on volition? Put differently, at 
what point does one’s ability to consciously and freely decide to either 
refrain from, or engage in, the use of drugs cross the threshold from 
mere choice to physiological compulsion? 
Or, digging even deeper, what if a case arose where an alien 
purported to be, for example, a pedophile, and was being subjected to 
removal to Saudi Arabia, where the government has openly authorized 
public beheadings for the crime of “inciting pedophilia.”119 Pedophilia, 
like addiction, is a disease rooted in the mind.120 Thus, if we adhere to 
                                                 
 117 Id. at 24:15. 
 118 Id. at 25:00. 
 119  Saudi Arabia: The situation of homosexuals, including treatment by authorities and 
available at:  ,GENCYAEFUGEE R UNHE T, 16 August 2002, legal penalties
February 28, 2017).(last visited  http://www.refworld.org/docid/3f7d4e1238.html  
 120 See, e.g., Ryan C.W. Hall & Richard C.W. Hall, A Profile of Pedophilia: 
Definition, Characteristics of Offenders, Recidivism, Treatment Outcomes, and Forensic Issues, 82 
MAYO CLINIC PROCEEDINGS 457, 463 (2007) (“A high comorbidity of impulse 
control disorders (e.g., explosive personality disorder, kleptomania, pyromania, 
pathological gambling) has been noted in pedophiles (30%-55%). These factors have 
been postulated to indicate that pedophiles may have neurodevelopmental 
perturbations.”); Colleen M. Berryessa, Potential Implications of Research on Genetic or 
Heritable Contributions to Pedophilia for the Objectives of Criminal Law, 8 RECENT 
ADVANCES DNA & GENE SEQUENCES 65, 68 (2014) (“Even though the biological 
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the line of logic endorsed in Jamai’s case—i.e., an identifiable cognitive 
condition is a reliable indicator of future conduct—then the 
hypothetical case of the pedophile being subjected to torture should, 
logically speaking, be assessed under the same approach. 
But this is where things get tricky. Although the logic holds 
true, the legal and moral knock-on effects of granting CAT relief to a 
drug addict like Jamai are not the same as those concomitant with 
granting relief to a murderer or pedophile. Nevertheless, courts can 
sidestep this logical conundrum altogether by focusing solely on the 
evidence in the case at issue, and whether the “more likely than not” 
standard is satisfied. 
C. Recommendation to the Third Circuit 
If and when the BIA reexamines Jamai’s case and makes its 
decision, it is likely that the Third Circuit’s subsequent decision to 
affirm or deny Jamai’s request for CAT relief will carry significant 
ramifications. Thus, while other issues in Jamai’s case will impact the 
court’s ultimate decision—including whether the legal standard of 
torture being “more likely than not” is deemed satisfied—it would be 
in the court’s best interest to refrain from making any ill-advised 
assertions on drug addiction. 
At the core of this question is the notion of free will, and 
specifically the extent to which a heroin addiction impedes autonomy. 
In this day and age, there is an abundance of evidence demonstrating 
that repeated heroin use changes the physical structure of the brain, 
thereby creating “long-term imbalances in neuronal and hormonal 
systems that are not easily reversed.”121 In this sense, developing an 
                                                 
facets of the disorder are still not principally determined and very few researchers 
study the causes of pedophilia, most scientists now consider the disorder as a 
complex deep-rooted predisposition and, over the last few decades, have 
correspondingly begun to study possible biological associations to the etiology and 
presence of the disorder, such as abnormal brain structure and function [26-31], 
irregular hormone levels [32-34], biological vulnerabilities to environmental factors 
[35, 36], and  . . . genetic influences.”). 
 121 See What Are the Long-term Effects of Heroin Use?, NATIONAL INSTITUTE ON 
DRUG ABUSE, http://www.drugabuse.gov/publications/research-
reports/heroin/what-are-long-term-effects-heroin-use (last updated June 2018). 
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addiction to heroin parallels a gradual loss in one’s ability to choose 
freely, as seeking and using the drug becomes a primary purpose in life. 
This understanding sheds light on Jamai’s contention that he will 
“always be an addict,” and hence will always have an urge to use heroin. 
Today, the scientific community has, by and large, accepted the 
“disease model” of addiction.122 In classifying addiction as a disease as 
opposed to a mere habit or craving, this model provides a framework 
for exploring “the neurobiological processes associated with the loss 
of control, compulsive drug taking, inflexible behaviour, and negative 
emotional states associated with addiction.”123 
The upshot of accepting this scientifically-endorsed view of 
addiction is that “deeply ingrained values about self-determination and 
personal responsibility” that tend to “frame drug use as a voluntary, 
hedonistic act” must give way to the understanding that “changes in 
the brain can ultimately erode a person’s ability to control the impulse 
to take addictive drugs.”124 Yet, despite a plethora of scientific 
evidence, many individuals seem reluctant to accept such a view. Some 
scholars have hypothesized that this difficulty may lie in “accepting as 
a bona fide disease one that erodes the neuronal circuits that enable us 
to exert free will.”125 
This proposition perhaps explains why Judge Sloviter, for 
example, insinuated multiple times during oral argument that Jamai 
could simply refrain from using drugs in Morocco, and thereby avoid 
being subjected to torture. To be sure, Judge Sloviter is correct insofar 
as drug use, as opposed to drug addiction, does not necessarily impede 
autonomy. But it could also be argued that Judge Sloviter’s position, in 
light of the evidence presented in Jamai’s case, parallels Judge 
Vomacka’s alarming rationale in the Ali case discussed above, as it was 
                                                 
 122 Nora D. Volkow & George Koob, Brain Disease Model of Addiction: Why Is 
It So Controversial? THE LANCET PSYCHIATRY 677, 678 (2015). 
 123 Id. at 677. 
 124 Nora D. Volkow et al., Neurobiologic Advances from the Brain Disease Model of 
Addiction, 374 N. Engl. J. Med. 363, 364 (2016). 
 125 Volkow, supra note 122, at 680. 
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Judge Vomacka who advanced the idea that Ali could avoid torture 
simply by abstaining from homosexual behavior. 
Fortunately, the Second Circuit recognized that Judge 
Vomacka’s line of reasoning was grounded in baseless stereotypes 
about homosexuality, and, in overruling his decision, engaged in a 
progressive-minded discussion on the innate nature of sexual 
identification. In due time, the Third Circuit many be confronted with 
an opportunity to follow in its sister court’s progressive footsteps and 
dispel disconcerting public attitudes and policies toward the addict. For 
the court, Jamai’s case represents an ideal vehicle for jumpstarting a 
reformist judicial movement in the realm of drug addiction. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Sparked by the U.N.’s promulgation of the Genocide 
Convention in 1948,126 the international community has made great 
strides over the course of the past several decades in combatting the 
practice of torture. Today, the effects of this significant human rights 
movement can be seen on a global scale, a movement that is due in 
large part to the United States’ unwavering adherence to CAT 
principles. In particular, American courts have increasingly adhered to 
the philosophy that each and every person, regardless of their personal 
history, political beliefs, or sexual orientation, deserves to be protected 
from being tortured in a foreign land. 
Eventually, the Third Circuit may have the opportunity to 
revisit Jamai’s case and engage in a meaningful dialogue about the 
accepted medical views regarding drug addiction and its curtailment on 
volition, and whether drug addicts can refrain from addictive behavior 
simply as a matter of choice. If history is any indication, the Third 
Circuit—if afforded the opportunity—will apply modern 
understandings of autonomy, and, in doing so, uphold the values that 
CAT seeks to protect. 
 
                                                 
 126 Genocide Convention, supra note 12. 
